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TAX FACTORS IN BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF
INVESTOR - SHAREHOLDERS AND OFFICER - SHAREHOLDERS
Edward J. Hawkins, Jr.
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
The simplest capital structure for a new company is a single class of
voting common stock. This stock is issued to the individuals investing
in the new company in direct proportion to the money or property con-
tributed by each. Control of the company is then proportionate to the
number of shares owned, and if the company grows, the increase is owned
proportionately.
There are many situations, however, in which such a simple capital
structure is unsatisfactory. One such situation may arise whenever sub-
stantially all of the capital of a new company is to be contributed by in-
vestors who are to play little or no part in daily management, and the
daily management is to be supplied by corporate officers who are able to
contribute very little money or property to the company's capital.1 Under
the simple capital structure just outlined, the officers, who risk their time
and effort, would have substantially no share in the control of the com-
pany and substantially no share in equity growth. Accordingly, these
men often will want the capital structure to be modified in such a way as
to give them greater interests than their financial contributions.
In the present discussion we shall consider a number of the devices
which have been developed to meet the situation just described. In par-
ticular, we shall consider elements in the capital structure designed to
allocate control and equity ownership disproportionately to cash invest-
ments; employment contracts; devices for increasing the cash investment
of the officers; and devices for decreasing the cash investment of the
investors.
ADJUSTING CAPITAL STRUCTURE TO GIVE OFFICERS
DISPROPORTIONATE CONTROL AND EQUITY OWNERSHIP
The first method of giving the officers a disproportionately large
share in control and equity ownership is the issuance to the investors of
debt, preferred stock, or common stock restricted as to voting rights. The
use of debt has already been discussed, particularly in reference to the
1. For simplicity, we shall refer to those who contribute money but little time as the investors
and those who contribute time but little money as the officers.
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frequently troublesome "thin capital" problem For present purposes, it
should simply be added that to the extent that debt instruments are
issued to an investor he is separated both from an interest in equity
growth and from control. The separation from control is not complete,
of course, since the investor will have the usual creditor's rights if there
is a default on the debt. In addition, it is possible to write into debt in-
struments a variety of provisions giving the investor, in effect, a veto
power over various decisions and even powers of affirmative control in
certain circumstances.
Preferred stock gives the investor no direct interest in equity growth.
Of course, if the company does grow and have large earnings, there will
be an indirect benefit to the preferred shareholder since his interest will
be better protected, and this added security may be reflected in an in-
crease in the market value of his stock. The control of the corporation
attached to the ownership of preferred stock can also be extensively
limited. The preferred shareholders' right to vote can be limited to cer-
tain questions, and by issuing fewer shares in proportion to the dollars
contributed, the proportionate voting strength of the preferred share-
holders even on such questions can be reduced.
It should be noted, on the other hand, that preferred stock has most
of the tax disadvantages of common stock without sharing in some of the
tax advantages. Like common stock, there is danger of dividend treat-
ment if the stock is redeemed by the company, and the company gets no
deduction for dividends paid. Preferred stock does not qualify under
section 1244 for ordinary loss treatment,3 and a company which issues
preferred stock does not qualify for the election under Subchapter S.4
Non-voting common stock is an alternative method of separating in-
vestment from control, while preserving to investors their full propor-
tionate share in equity growth. Of course, the division need not be
simply between a class of voting stock and a class of non-voting stock:
voting power may be divided between the classes in various ways. One
class may be entitled to vote only on certain questions, or it may have
fewer shares (and hence fewer votes) per dollar of investment, or voting
by classes may be required on certain questions. Of course, provisions of
this type in the case of offerings in Ohio must be cleared with the Ohio
Division of Securities, which will want to make sure that the securities
are not being issued on unconscionable terms.'
2. See discussion pp. 205-09.
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, S 1244(c) (1). (Hereinafter cited as 5.)
4. S 1371 (a) (4). § 306 also imposes additional handicaps on the use of preferred stock,
but S 306(c) (2) makes these provisions inapplicable to preferred stock issued as part of the
original capital structure. See discussion pp. 319-30.
5. OHIO REv. CODE § 1707.09. Variations in voting rights are dealt with in OsIo REv.
CODE S 1701.44(A), .52.
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The tax treatment of non-voting common stock is substantially the
same as the treatment of voting common stock. Even the ordinary loss
provisions of section 1244 are available.6 One tax disadvantage, how-
ever, is that if the company makes use of more than one class of stock it
is not qualified to make the election under Subchapter S7
It is possible to use the devices just discussed in combinations. For
example, the investors may be given both debt instruments and non-
voting stock, the non-voting stock to become voting stock in the event
of a default on the debt. Where the investor does receive a package of
stock and securities in a greater face amount than his cash investment,
however, he may have difficulty in establishing the proper allocation of
basis among the items received. This would become significant when,
for example, the debt instruments are repaid at face.'
Another consideration in analyzing the devices discussed above is that
they are useful for other purposes than simply giving disproportionate
advantages to the company's officers. From the investor's point of view,
the acceptance of preferred stock or debt may make his interest sub-
stantially more secure. It also may assist his estate planning and charita-
ble giving by permitting him to distribute economic interests where he
would be unwilling to distribute operating control. The use of debt may
also facilitate the subsequent repayment to the investor of some of his
capital.
EmPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
In some cases, the objectives of the corporate officer can be sub-
stantially achieved by use of an employment contract, which would
eliminate any need for complicating the company's capital structure. For
example, such a contract can protect him from being discharged from his
position and even perhaps from having his functions and area of operat-
ing control reduced. Furthermore, a provision in the contract for com-
pensation which is to be measured by a percentage of the company's gross
or net income can serve to increase his income in proportion to the suc-
cess of the company in a manner analogous to the income participation
through stock ownership.' There are great differences between stock
6. Assuming, of course, that the stock is issued for money or property and not for services.
§ 1244(c) (1) (D).
7. § 1371(a) (4). Another possible tax problem is that the Internal Revenue Service might
argue that the non-voting stock is of lower market value, and hence that the capital structure
involves an element of gift or compensation. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1 (b) (1). (Hereinafter
cited as Reg.). For statistics indicating that, at least in publicly held companies, non-voting
stock has substantially as high a market value as voting stock, see Comment, 4 STAN. L. Rsv.
575, 577, 585 (1952).
8. If the debt instruments and non-voting stock cannot be sold separately but constitute an
indivisible "package" the thin capital problem would, of course, be aggravated.
9. For a high bracket officer, it may be more desirable to accumulate earnings in a corpra-
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ownership and an employment contract. No employment contract cre-
ates a property interest which can be sold to others or left to one's chil-
dren. However, careful draftsmanship can, if it is desired, minimize these
differences. For example, death or retirement benefits can be included
in addition to current compensation.
It should be noted that a percentage compensation arrangement has
certain additional advantages. It will produce a low yield during the
early low-income years so often experienced by new businesses, which
puts a minimum strain on the company's finances. In later high-income
years, on the other hand, the use of the percentage arrangement will help
to protect the company against a contention that the compensation paid
is unreasonably high and hence non-deductible."0
DEVICES FOR INCREASING INVESTMENT OF OFFICERS
The devices discussed so far have been designed to give the corporate
officer a share in control and equity growth, disproportionate to his in-
vestment, from the time the company is first formed. A different solu-
tion would be to allow control to remain proportionate to investment,
but to permit the officer to increase his investment on advantageous
terms.
The best known device for permitting the corporate officer to in-
crease his investment is the restricted stock option. A full discussion of
restricted stock options as such is outside the scope of this article," but
it is relevant here to consider some particular problems which such
options involve for small companies and the advantages and disad-
vantages of including such options in the steps taken at the time of in-
corporation.
The first of the problems which are particularly relevant to small
corporations arises from the fact that minimum permissible restricted
stock option prices are measured by a percentage of the fair market value
of the stock at the time the option is granted.'2 The valuation of the
stock of small closely-held companies is never easy, and it is especially
difficult where the valuation must be so exact and where it will finally
be tested only after the passage of several years has placed overtones of
hindsight on the question. Accordingly, either the validity of the option
may be rendered uncertain because of doubt as to whether the option
tion of which he owns a percentage of the stock than to receive percentage compensation tax-
able as ordinary income. However, where the officer is in a lower tax bracket than the cor-
poration, fully taxable compensation in the proper amount can produce more wealth after
taxes for both officers and investors, since it is deductible by the corporation at a higher rate
than it is taxed to the officer.
10. Reg. § 1.162-7(b) (2).
11. For a discussion of both restricted and non-restricted stock options, see Vesely, Compensa-
tion Through the Use of Corporate Stock, 29 U. CINc. L. REv. 52 (1960).
12. S 421(d) (1) (A).
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price is high enough, or the option price may have to be set considerably
higher than the law requires simply to provide a margin of safety.
A second problem is that a stock option interferes with the use of
section 1244, a tax benefit provision relating to certain stock of small
corporations. Not only is this benefit inapplicable to stock issued pur-
suant to an option "granted in whole or in part for services," but the very
existence of the option disqualifies, for the purposes of section 1244, all
other stock issued while the option is outstanding."3
A third difficulty with stock options is that although they permit
the officer to share immediately in the equity growth of the company,
his share in the control of the company is increased only as the option
is exercised. Accordingly, except to the extent that he is protected by
an employment contract, or the terms of the option itself, his interest may
be subject to defeat by the investors at any time until he actually pur-
chases the stock. For example, a common form of stock option can be
exercised by the officer only if he is an employee, and hence the option
can be terminated simply by firing the officer. More subtly, the directors
can prevent the officer from exercising the option by holding his salary
below the amount which he will need in order to pay the option price.
Such attempts to defeat an option would seem more likely to occur in a
small company where exercise of the option may substantially affect
corporate control, than in large companies where the effect of stock on
control is negligible in any event.
The suggestion that an officer's ability to exercise his option may
depend on his salary level illustrates the fact that in the case of a small
new company and a corporate officer without substantial financial
means, a fourth major problem is paying the option price. Several fac-
tors make this problem especially difficult. The first is that the restricted
stock option price must be substantially as high as the fair market value
of the stock at the time the option is granted. 4 If the option is granted
at the time of incorporation this value will presumably be the full amount
paid per share by the investors. If the option is granted later, the valua-
tion difficulties already mentioned tend to result in a price which is
conservative in the sense of being too high, as a precaution against sub-
sequent complete disqualification of the option.
A second factor is that if the officer must accumulate the option price
from salary, he must first pay the ordinary income tax on the receipt of
the salary. A third is that the option must be exercised within a limited
period. No restricted stock option can run more than ten years, and if
13. This is the harsh position taken by the Treasury in Reg. § 1.1244(c)- 1(c) (2), (e), (h).
14. The general rule is 85% fair market value, § 421(d) (1) (A), but an officer owning
10% of the company's stock when the option is granted must pay 110% of fair market value,
§ 421 (d) (1) (C).
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the officer owns more than ten per cent of the company's stock when the
option is granted the period can be no longer than five years. 5
A fourth factor is the difficulty of borrowing the purchase price if
the officer is without personal means and can offer as collateral only
stock in a small new corporation. It may be possible for the company
itself to meet this part of the problem by selling the stock to the officer
on an installment basis. However, such a program would have to be
carefully drafted in order for it to qualify as an "exercise" of the option
for tax purposes, but not to constitute a loan to a corporate officer which
would give rise to personal liability for the directors. 6 In addition, the
advantage to the investors of requiring the officers to contribute an equal
amount per share to the company seems much diluted if the money paid
not only comes ultimately from salaries paid to the officers by the com-
pany but also in the first instance comes from money loaned to the offi-
cers by the company.
It is not necessary, of course, to limit consideration to options which
qualify as "restricted stock options." A company may deliberately make
the option price much lower than the fair market value of the stock,
and make the duration of the option longer than the five or ten years
permitted by the Internal Revenue Code, thus eliminating some of the
problems discussed above. The disadvantage of such a non-restricted
stock option is that the difference between the fair market value of the
stock and the option price is treated as ordinary income to the officer
in the year the option is exercised.' 7 However, this disadvantage may be
outweighed by the longer period within which the option may be exer-
cised. Also, if the value of the stock falls, which is not unlikely in the
early years of a new company, the bargain element in the option may
be relatively low, and the tax on this, plus the tax on the salary received
to pay the lower option price, may be less than the tax on the salary
needed to pay the high price under a restricted stock option. The com-
pany's cash position, on the other hand, is not injured by the low option
price if the officer's situation is such that he could pay a higher price
15. § 421 (d) (1) (C).
16. Compare OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.17, with OHIO REv. CODE § 1701.95. If the terms
of the loan are too lenient, the Commissioner may contend that the stock was not in fact pur-
chased when the option was exercised. Compare National Clothing Co., 23 T.C. 944 (1955),
acq., 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 5, with Patent Button Co. v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.
1953).
Reg. § 1.421-1 (e) defines "exercise," in effect, as the making of an irrevocable contract for
the sale of stock. The definition would seem to permit a binding commitment by the officer
to purchase stock at a specified later date. This would serve to extend the time limit for rais-
ing the purchase price, but it is doubtful whether either investor or officer would find such
an irrevocable obligation acceptable for any very extended period.
17. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (1). Income is realized on receipt of the option if its value is "readily
ascertainable," but an option on a small company's stock would probably never qualify for this
treatment under the Regulations. Reg. § 1.421-6(c).
[Mach
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only by drawing a correspondingly higher salary."8 The company's cash
position may even be improved, to the extent that granting the bargain
price option enables it to secure the officer's services at a lower cash
salary.
Still another possibility to consider is a non-restricted option on
restricted stock. It is possible to subject the stock received pursuant to
an option to restrictions which deprive the shares of any fair market
value for a certain period of time. In such a case, the officer will not
be taxed on the difference between the option price and the value of the
stock without such restrictions, at least until the time years later when
they expire, and perhaps not even then. 9
It may be wiser for a small new company not to use options at all,
but to issue stock directly for services. As discussed above in reference
to bargain-price options, this may not hurt the company's cash position as
much as it might appear, and it very effectively increases the officer's
stock interest. The officer will, of course, be taxed on the value of the
stock, but this value may be very low in the company's early years. Even
this tax can be deferred, by the use of limitations on the stock.0 The
corporation probably will be able to deduct the same amount treated as
income to the employee without paying out any cash except that necessary
to pay the employees' own income tax.?'
The assumption that the tax will be low on stock issued to the officer
directly depends upon the company having losses or low earnings in its
18. This statement should be qualified by noting that under Reg. 5 1A21-6(e), the com-
pany's tax deduction for compensation paid is geared to the taxable income received by the
officer from the exercise of a non-restricted option. Consequently, the less income to the of-
ficer, the lower the company's tax deductions. The situation is even more complex, of course,
if the company pays the officer additional salary to cover tax he must pay on the salary paid to
him to permit exercise of the option.
It should be noted that the general comparison between the tax impacts of restricted and
non-restricted stock options assumes that the restricted option specifies a fixed price, an assump-
tion which is made throughout this article. In fact, § 421 permits reduction of the option price
in certain circumstances and also permits "variable price options." §§ 421(d) (1) (A) (ii),
(e); Schlesinger, Selected Problems in the Use of Restricted Stock Options, 36 TAXBs 709
(1958). Both alternatives, however, require measurements of fair market value which are
likely to be quite impractical in the case of a small closely-held company.
19. The Regulations hold that the employee realizes taxable income when the restrictions ex-
pire. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (2). This is contrary to a Tax Court holding that the expiration
of restrictions is not a taxable event. Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951), nonacq., T.I.R.
248, 4 P-H 1960 FED. TAX SHRV. " 54,967, withdrawing acq. 1952-1 CUM. BULL. 3.
The restriction used for illustrative purposes by the Regulations is a requirement that the
employee resell the stock to the company at the price he paid for it if his employment ter-
minates within two years after he acquires the stock, for any reason except his death. Pre-
sumably, restrictions should not be so severe as to permit the exercise of the option to be
regarded as unreal. Cf. note 16 supra.
It is unfortunate that the term "restrictions" is used to refer to both options qualifying
under § 421 and certain limitations on stock subject to nonqualifying options.
20. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (5). Cf. notes 16 and 19 supra.
21. Although there have been expressions of doubt on this point, the Commissioner's last
official position still seems to be I.T. 1197, I-1 CUM. BULL. 269 (1922), allowing the deduc-
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early years. Some companies are more fortunate and enjoy a prompt and
rapid growth. For these companies, restricted stock options, whereby the
corporate officers pay no tax on the bargain element, are preferable to
the direct issuance of stock, taxable at its ever increasing fair market
value. Where this is a real possibility, therefore, the best solution may
be a combination of stock options and an agreement to issue stock as
compensation. If the company is immediately successful, the options can
be used rather than the direct stock compensation. If the company en-
counters adversity, direct stock compensation can be used rather than
the options. It is, however, difficult to set up so complex a plan at the
very beginning of the corporation's life. In addition, the issuance of
stock asserted to be worth five dollars in exchange for services at the same
time that an option to purchase stock at one hundred dollars is outstand-
ing may create a dilemma. If the officer receives stock for compensation
and subsequently exercises the option as well, he may ultimately receive
twice the percentage of control intended by the parties. Conversely, if
the number of shares subject to the option is reduced each time shares
are issued as compensation, the arrangement may be regarded as a dis-
qualifying modification of the option, lowering the option price, in effect,
from one hundred dollars in cash to five dollars in services.
A final problem relevant to our topic is whether stock options, if
they are to be used, or a provision for issuing stock as compensation,
should be included in the steps taken at the time of incorporation. There
is no question, of course, that these points can be and should be part of
the original understanding or contract between the investors and officers.
It is also desirable in setting forth the number and par value of shares in
the corporate charter to allow for the requirements of an option or com-
pensation program." Furthermore, the price paid for stock by the in-
vestors presumably sets the fair market value of the stock at that time,
and hence restricted stock options can be issued then without the usual
tremendous problem, discussed above, of valuing dosely held stock.
However, two considerations weigh against issuing options at once.
The first is that if the company goes through an initial period of adversity,
the value of the stock may fall substantially and demonstrably, thus per-
mitting lower option prices. Second, since no stock issued after the
tion. Any other result would be inconsistent with the allowance of the deduction in reference
to non-restricted options. Reg. § 1.421-6(e).
A possible disadvantage of issuing stock directly for services is that it would not qualify
under § 1244, which does not cover stock issued for services. However, as has already been
discussed, stock issued pursuant to options issued for services also do not qualify under 5
1244.
22. Stock with a high par or stated value may present a problem when issued as compensa-
tion. The directors must find that the services rendered are worth the par value of the stock.
If this is interpreted as a sale of the stock at a high price, it would seem inconsistent with a
contention that the stock has a low fair market value.
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option is granted will qualify under section 1244, as has already been
discussed, the granting of the options should at least be delayed until
all of the common stock originally subscribed for has been issued.s
DEVICES FOR DECREASING INVESTMENT OF INVESTORS
An alternative to increasing the investment of the officers is to de-
crease the investment of the investors. The three principal methods of
doing this are the repayment of debt, the redemption of preferred or
common stock, and the use of buy-sell agreements.
The great danger in repaying debt arises from the "thin capital" doc-
trine already discussed 4 The debt may become due at an awkward
time from the viewpoint of the company's finances, although failure to
pay it may dangerously aggravate the thin capital problem.25 Otherwise,
the repayment of debt has a number of advantages to the investor, who
can recover his money without tax to himself and without reducing his
control or equity ownership.
Whether a redemption of some of the stock held by the investor will
reduce his control and equity ownership depends upon the terms of the
stock redeemed. The inflexibility of a debt repayment schedule can be
avoided, perhaps at the price of rendering it less certain that the redemp-
tion will actually be undertaken. The real problems, however, relate to
taxation. In the first place, there is at least a theoretical danger that the
accumulation of the cash needed for the redemption will weaken the com-
pany's defenses against the accumulated earnings tax." A more common
problem is the possibility that the redemption price will be taxed as a
dividend. The statute does expressly exempt certain stock redemptions
from dividend treatment, but none of the statutory exceptions are in-
tended to cover the case of the investor recouping part of his investment
without a substantial reduction in his share of control2 On the other
hand, of course, if the company has made the election to be taxed under
Subchapter S, its earnings for all completed years during which the elec-
tion was in effect will have already been taxed to the shareholders, and
to this extent the danger of a redemption being treated as a taxable
dividend will have been eliminated.2"
23. Stock is legally issued when it is subscribed for and the subscription is accepted. It is
not relevant whether or when certificates are issued. This is both the state law rule for Ohio
corporations, OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.01(F), and the rule adopted by the Treasury Regula-
tions dealing with the federal documentary stamp tax, Reg. § 43A301-1 (a).
24. See discussion pp. 205-09.
25. See discussion p. 207.
26. Cf. Pelton Steel Castings Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 958 (1958). Contra, Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 9 9797 (4th Cir. Nov. 7, 1960).
27. §§ 302(b), 303.
28. There are, however, some cases where redemption of the stock of a Subchapter S corpora-
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Buy-sell agreements, the third method of reducing the investor's in-
vestment, can also serve a number of other objectives and can involve a
wide range of problems. Space does not permit a full discussion here of
this complex subject.29 The importance of such agreements for the
present discussion is that either the investor or the officer may be far
more willing to agree to permit control to lie in the hands of the other,
if, through such an agreement, assurance can be given that this control
will not fall into the hands of widows, minor children, or strangers.
Even more important, it gives the corporate officer with limited financial
resources a real prospect of eventually taking over control of the business,
a transfer which the investor is more inclined to agree to since it makes
his interest more secure and liquid for estate planning purposes without
reducing his control or his share in equity growth during his lifetime.
There are several reasons for including such an agreement in the
steps taken at the time of incorporation. It is then mechanically easiest
to put restrictions on stock certificates or in the corporate charter or by-
laws. It is then easiest to integrate such an agreement with the general
plan for the capital structure of the company and with any agreement
designed to prevent transfers which would defeat an election under Sub-
chapter S. It also would seem easier and fairer to negotiate the agree-
ment while all parties are alive and well and entertaining the hope of
being the survivor.
A disadvantage of drafting a buy-sell agreement at this time is that
since the company is just starting out the parties may not be sure that
it will be successful enough to justify the legal effort and expense in-
volved. Even more important, the relationship between the parties, the
competence of the management, and the character of the investors are
often unknown and untested factors when the business begins, and they
are very important factors in determining the type of contract to which
one would wish to subject one's widow. On the other hand, these same
objections pervade the entire area of allocating control and interests in
equity growth. Indeed, while they add to the difficulties of the prob-
lem, these very uncertainties often make it especially important to secure
a clear and early understanding as to the distribution of company control.
tion may have ordinary income consequences. For example, the company might have undis-
tributed earnings and profits from years in which the election was not in effect, plus earnings
and profits for the current year. In addition, where a stock redemption comes within the
collapsible corporation provisions, the gain will be taxed as ordinary income whether or not
earnings and profits are present. In measuring gain, it should be noted that pursuant to S
1376 the basis of the stock will have been increased by undistributed earnings taxed to the
stockholder and reduced by losses deducted by the stockholder.
29. For a discussion of buy-sell agreements see 2 'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, 2-80
(1958); Calkins, Coughlin, Hacker, Kidder, Sugarman & Wolf, Tax Problems of Close Cor-
porations: A Survey, 10 WEST. REs. L. REV. 9, 83-98 (1959).
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